

Infopack

EDITORIAL

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Of Feminist Movements and Neoliberal Crisis

- Piyush Pant

Nancy Fraser's book titled '**Fortunes of Feminism: From State-Managed Capitalism to Neoliberal Crisis**' is a collection of essays written from 1985 - 2010 by her. She is an American socialist feminist philosopher and critical theorist. The book is a rich and complex text that dissects the "drama in three acts" which in Fraser's view is the thread of second-wave feminism. If act one is the moment when the feminist movement joined radical movements to transform society through uncovering gender injustice and capitalism's androcentrism, in act two Fraser highlights with regret a switch from redistribution to recognition and difference, and a shift to identity politics that risks to support neo-liberalism in its effort to build a free market society. In act three, which is still unfolding, the problem of justice is reframed, and the relationships between feminist movements meant to be radical and the changes in the act in present time, has the potential to open new unpredictable scenarios. The book also makes distinction between material paid reproduction and symbolic reproduction (women's unpaid activities) as well as the distinction between system integrated action contexts (such as the capitalist economic system) and socially integrated action context epitomized by the modern, restricted, nuclear family. Fraser brings back gender blindness of Habermas's view to the theorization of a battle line between system and life-world institutions. In the book, Fraser also sharply focuses on households as loci of exchange services, labour, cash, as well as coercion and violence and on the great mistake represented by the restriction of the term "power" to bureaucratic contexts.

It is said that through a theoretical political approach, the book **Fortunes of Feminism** provides a clear cut historical and theoretical account of what second-wave feminism has been at its beginnings, has recently become, and has the potential of becoming. The writer's perspective highlights key issues on feminist theories and politics in the intersection of multiple axes of social differentiation, gender, class, race, ethnicity, religion, nationality, sexuality in their ambivalence and conundrums.

However, Fraser's work has also received some critical comments. For example, writers Ozlem A Slan and Zeynep Gambetti say that Fraser stands on particularly narrow empirical ground when she accuses the feminist movement of abandoning the ideal of the just and equitable distribution of material resources. One needs to ask whether or not the absence of an integral systemic analysis can be attributed to the entire feminist movement, for there are very different forms of feminist practice. They further point out that having read Fraser's book, one ends up thinking that feminist activists and academics have totally abandoned the critique of market-based employment opportunities for women.

In this issue of **Infopack** we bring you the summary of Nancy Fraser's well appreciated book.

Popular Information Centre

Fortunes of Feminism from State-Managed Capitalism to Neoliberal Crisis

By

Nancy Fraser
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Bird's Eye View

This book is a collection of essays written by American social feminist, philosopher and critical theorist Nancy Fraser from 1985 to 2010. Written in a rich and complex text, the book aims at dissecting the "drama in three acts" which, the writer believes, is the thread of second-wave feminism. The writer says that emerging from the ferment surrounding the New Left, the "movement for women's liberation" began life as a rebellious force, which challenges male domination in state-organized capitalist societies of the post war era. In Act One, feminists joined radical movements to transform society through uncovering gender injustice and capitalism's androcentrism and sought to transform society root and branch. In Act Two, its transformative impulses were channeled into a political imaginary that foregrounded "difference". Turning "from redistribution to recognition", the movement shifted its attention to cultural politics, just as a rising neoliberalism declared war on social equality. In Act Three, that is still unfolding, we could see a reinvigorated feminism join other emancipatory forces aiming to subject runaway markets to democratic control.

Nancy Fraser says that eventually historians will explain how neoliberalizing forces succeeded, for a time at least, in defusing the more radical currents of second-wave feminism - and how a new rebellious upsurge managed to reanimate them. Here the goal is to ascertain which modes of feminist theorizing should be incorporated into the new political imaginaries now being invented by new generations for Act Three?

The writer further says that composed over the first twenty-five-plus years as interventions in theoretical debates, the essays collected here document major shifts in the feminist imaginary since the 1970s. For this purpose, the writer has grouped them in three parts corresponding to the three acts of the drama mentioned above. In Part One, Nancy has included pieces that seek to marry a feminist sensibility to a New Left critique of the welfare state. These essays situate second-wave feminism in a broader field of democratizing anti-capitalist struggles. Reflecting the historical shift from main stream social democracy to the new social movement, these essays defend the latter's expanded understanding of politics, even as they also criticize some influential ways of theorizing it.

PART ONE

Feminism Insurgent: Radicalizing Critique in the Era of Social Democracy

The chapters comprising Part One document the shift from post war social democracy to early second-wave feminism, seeing as current of New Left radicalism exuding the heady spirit of the 1960s and 1970s, these essays reflect the successes of the new social movements in breaking through the confines of welfare-state politics as usual.

Chapter 1

What's Critical about Critical Theory? The case of Habermas and Gender

Nancy Fraser says that no one better captures the "post-Marxian" impulses than Jurgen Habermas. She says that a radical critic of post war social democracy, Habermas sought to scrutinize aspects of the Keynesian

welfare-state that escaped standard liberal analyses. She further says that ignoring the "labour monism" of his Frankfurt School predecessors, while seeking to continue the critique of reification by other means, he proposed a "communications-theoretic" reconstruction of Critical Theory. The upshot was a new diagnosis of late-capitalist ills: the "internal colonization of the life world by systems". Resonating with New Left antipathy to bureaucratic paternalism, Habermas's diagnosis validated the "post-materialist" concerns of the new social movements. Exceeding liberal criticisms of distributive injustice, it promised to broaden our sense of what could be subject to political challenge - and emancipatory change.

Going into the detailed discussion of the six theses presented by Habermas in this chapter, Nancy Fraser underlines the important critical points of these theses. She says that first, Habermas account fails to theorize the patriarchal, norm-mediated character of late-capitalist official-economic and administrative systems. Likewise, it fails to theorize the systemic, money-and power-mediated character of male dominance in the domestic sphere of the late-capitalist lifeworld. Consequently, his colonization thesis fails to grasp that the channels of influence between system and lifeworld institutions are multidirectional. And it tends to replicate, rather than to problematize, a major institutional support of women's subordination in late capitalism, namely, the gender-based separation of the state-regulated economy of sex-segmented paid work and social welfare, and the male-dominated public sphere, from privatized female childbearing. Thus, while Habermas wants to be critical of male dominance, his diagnostic categories deflect attention elsewhere, to the allegedly overriding problem of gender-neutral reification. As a result his programmatic conception of decolonization bypasses key feminist questions; it fails to address the issue of how to restructure the relation of child bearing to paid work; and citizenship. Finally, Habermas's categories tend to misrepresent the causes and underestimate the scope of the feminist challenge to welfare-state capitalism.

The writer says that in general, the principal blind spots of Habermas's theory with respect to gender are traceable to his categorical opposition between system and lifeworld institutions, and to the two more elementary oppositions from which it is compounded; the one concerning reproduction functions and the one concerning types of action integration. She further thinks that Habermas's blind spots are instructive. They permit us to conclude something about what the categorical framework of a socialist-feminist critical theory of welfare-state capitalism should look like. One crucial requirement is that this framework not be such as to put the male-headed nuclear family and the state-regulated official economy on to opposite sides of the major categorical divide. She says that we rather require a framework sensitive to the similarities between them, one which puts them on the same side of the line as institutions which, albeit in different ways, enforce women's subordination, since both family and official economy appropriate our labour, short-circuit our participation in the interpretation of our needs, and shield normatively secured need interpretations from political contestation. She says that a second crucial requirement is that this framework contains no a priori assumptions about the unidirectionality of social motion and causal influence, that it be sensitive to the ways in which allegedly this appearing institutions and norms persist in structuring social reality. A third and last crucial requirement is that this framework should not be such as to pose it the evil of welfare-state capitalism exclusively or primarily as the evil of reification.

In general, then the document's first chapter develops a critique of an important left-wing critic of social democracy.

Chapter 2

Struggle over Needs: Outline of a Socialist-Feminist Critical Theory of Late-Capitalist Political Culture

This chapter marks a shift to constructive feminist theorizing. Aiming to put work the lessons of the first chapter, the writer sketches a gender-sensitive critique of the structural dynamics and conflict tendencies of late-capitalist societies. "Struggle over Needs", a 1989 essay, reconceptualizes the welfare state by resituating distribution within discourse. Building on Habermas's insights, it employs a version of the linguistic term to underwrite the expanded understanding of politics associated with second-wave feminism. The key move here is a shift from the usual social-democratic focus on conflicts over need satisfaction to a new, democratic-feminist focus "politics of need interpretation". The effect is to the distributive paradigm which posits a

monological objectivism of basic needs, with a gender-sensitive communicative paradigm, which construes the interpretation of needs as a political stake. The writer says that this approach differs from Habermas's in a crucial respect. Instead of naturalizing hegemonic notions of public and private she treats those categories to as discursively constructed, gender-and power-saturated objects of political struggle; and she links the politicization of needs to feminist struggles over where and how to draw the boundaries between "the political", "the economic", and "the domestic". She says that her aim is to repoliticize a range of gender issues that Habermas unwittingly took off the table.

Further, discussing at length Fraser points out that in late-capitalist, welfare-state societies, talk about people's needs is an important species of political discourse. The feminists claim that the state should provide for parents' day-care needs, while social conservatives insist that children need their mothers' care, and economic conservative claim that the market, not the government, is the best institution for meeting needs.

Talk about needs has not always been central to western political culture; it has often been considered antithetical to politics and relegated to the margins of political life. However, in welfare-state societies, talk regarding needs has been institutionalized as a major idiom of political discourse. It coexists, albeit often uneasily, with talk about rights and interests at the very centre of political life. Indeed, this peculiar juxtaposition of a discourse about needs with discourses about rights and interests is one of the distinctive marks of late-capitalist political culture.

She says that her analysis of talk relating to needs raises to very obvious and pressing philosophical issues. One is the question of whether and how it is possible to distinguish better from worse interpretations of peoples' needs. The other is the question of the relationship between needs claims and rights. Fraser says that scholars have demonstrated again and again that authoritative views purporting to be neutral and disinterested actually express the partial and interested prospective of dominant social groups. In addition, many feminist theorists have made use of poststructuralist approaches that deny the possibility of distinguishing warranted claims from power plays. As a result, there is now a significant strand of relativist sentiment within feminist rank. At the same time, many other feminists worry that relativism undermines the possibility of political commitment.

The writer here poses a question: can we distinguish better from worse interpretations of people's needs? She herself answers by claiming that we can distinguish better from worse interpretations of people's needs. She elaborates that to say that needs are culturally constructed and discursively interpreted is not to say that any interpretation regarding need is as good as any other. However, justification cannot be understood in traditional objectivist terms as correspondence, as if it were a matter of finding the interpretation that matches the true nature of the need as it really is in itself, independent of any interpretation. Nor can justification be premised on a pre-established point of epistemic superiority, as if it were a matter of finding the group in society with the privileged "standpoint".

The writer again raises the question: then what should an account of interpretative justification consist in? She herself replies that in her opinion there are at least two distinct kinds of considerations such an account would have to encompass and to balance. First, there are procedural considerations concerning the social processes by which various competing interpretations of need are generated. In general, procedural considerations dictate that, all other things being equal, the best interpretations regarding need are those reached by means of communicative processes that most closely approximate ideals of democracy, equality, and fairness. In addition, in general, consequentialist considerations dictate that, all other things being equal, the best interpretations regarding need are those that do not disadvantage some groups of people vis-a-vis others. In sum, therefore, justifying some interpretations of social needs as better than other involves balancing procedural and consequentialist considerations, meaning balancing democracy and equality.

About the relationship between needs and rights, the writer says that this, too, is a controversial issue in contemporary theory. She says that critical legal theorists have argued that rights claims work against radical social transformation by enshrining tenets of bourgeois individualism. She also points out that some feminist moral theorists suggest that an orientation toward responsibilities is preferable to an orientation towards rights. That's why Fraser says that together, these views might lead some to want to think of talk regarding

needs as an alternative to talk regarding rights.. On the other hand, she again points out, many feminists worry that left-wing critics of rights play into the hands of our political opponents. After all, conservatives traditionally prefer to distribute aid as matter of need instead of right precisely in order to avoid assumptions of entitlement that could carry egalitarian implications. For these reasons, some feminist activists and legal scholars have sought to develop and defend alternative understandings of rights. Their approach might imply that suitably reconstructed rights claims and needs claims could be mutually compatible, even inter-translatable. Fraser says that she align herself with those who favour translating justified claims regarding needs into social rights. Like many radical critics of existing social-welfare programmes, she is committed to opposing the forms of paternalism that arise when needs-related claims are divorced from rights-related claims. And unlike some communitarian, socialist, and feminist critics, she does not believe that rights-related talk is inherently individualistic, bourgeois-liberal, and androcentric; it only becomes so where societies establish the wrong rights, as, for example, when the (putative) right to private property is permitted to trump other rights, including social rights.

She further says that to treat justified needs-related claims as the bases for new social rights is to begin to overcome obstacles to the effective exercise of some existing rights. She says that it is true, as Marxists and others have claimed, that classical liberal rights to free expression, assembly, and the like are "merely formal". But this says more about the social context in which they are currently embedded than about their "intrinsic" character, for, in a context devoid of poverty, inequality, and oppression, formal liberal rights could be broadened and transformed into substantive rights, say, to collective self-determination. In the end, she says vehemently that this work is motivated by the conviction that, for the time being, needs-related talk is with us for better or worse. For the foreseeable future, political agents, including feminists, will have to operate on a terrain where needs-related talk is the discursive coin of the realm. But, the writer says that as she has tried to show, the idiom is neither inherently emancipator nor inherently repressive. Rather, it is multivalent and contested. Nancy Fraser says that the larger aim of her project is to help clarify the prospects for democratic and egalitarian social change by sorting out the emancipatory from the repressive possibilities of needs-related talk.

Chapter 3

A Genealogy of "Dependency": Tracing a Keyword of the US Welfare State

Jointly written with the feminist historian Linda Gordon in 1994, this chapter explores the changing modifications in that "keyword of the welfare state" as barometer of shifting political wings. Written at the height of the "welfare reform" frenzy in the US, when attacks on "welfare dependency" dominated policy debates, this essay charts the process by which that characteristic neoliberal preoccupation came to supplant the long-standing social-democratic focus on attacking poverty.

"A Genealogy of 'Dependency'" digs out buried layers of discursive history that continue to weigh on the present. Mapping changing configurations of political economy and gender dynamics, this chapter analyses to epochal historical shifts in the meaning of "dependency". First, the shift is from a preindustrial patriarchal usage, in which "dependency" was non-stigmatized majority condition meaning that women, however subordinate, shared a condition of dependency with many men, to a modern industrial male-supremacist usage. This constructed a specifically feminine and highly stigmatized sense of "dependency". Secondly, there is subsequent shift to a postindustrial usage, in which growing numbers of relatively prosperous women claimed the same kind of "independence" that men do, while a more stigmatized but still feminized sense of "dependency" attaches to "deviant" groups who are considered "superfluous". Linda Gordon and Nancy Fraser demonstrate, in this chapter, that racializing practices play a major role in historical reconstructions of "dependency", as do changes in the organization and meaning of labour. Questioning current assumption about the meaning and desirability of "independence", they conclude by sketching a "transvaluative" feminist critique aimed at overcoming the dependence/independence dichotomy.

In providing a genealogy of "dependency", the writers sketched the history of this term and explicate the assumption and connotation it carries today in US debate about welfare: especially assumption about human nature, gender roles, the causes of poverty, the nature of citizenship, the sources of entitlement, and what

counts as work and as a contribution to society. They think that unreflective usage of this keyword serve to enshrine certain interpretations of social life as authoritative and to delegitimize or obscure other, generally to the advantage of dominant groups in society and to the disadvantage of subordinate one. In nutshell, the writers provide a critique of ideology in the form of a critical political semantics.

The writers argue that "dependency" is an ideological term. They say that in current US policy discourse, it usually refers to the conditions of poor women with children who maintain their families with neither a male bread winner nor an adequate wage and who rely for economic support on a stingy and politically unpopular government programme called Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). Participation in this highly stigmatized programme may be demoralizing in many cases, even though it may enable women to live abusive or unsatisfying relationship without having to give up their children. In current debates, the expression **welfare dependency** evokes the image of "the welfare mother", often figured as a young, unmarried Black women of uncontrolled sexuality. The writers feel that the power of this image is over-determined since it condenses multiple and often contradictory meanings of dependency. They argue that only by disaggregating those different strands, by unpacking the tacit assumptions and evaluative connotations that underline them, can the force of the stereotype be understood and dislodged.

Fraser and Gordon say that "dependency", once a general-purpose term for all social relations of subordination, is now differentiated into several analytically distinct registers. In the economic register, its meaning has shifted from gaining one's livelihood by working for someone else to relying for support on charity or welfare; wage labour now confers independence. In the socio-legal register, the term denotes a socio-legal status, the lack of separate legal or public identity, as in the status of married women created by coverture. The meaning of "dependency" as subsumption is unchanged, but its scope of reference and connotations have altered: once a socially approved majority condition, it first became a group-based status deemed proper for some classes of persons but not others and then shifted again to designate (except in the case children) anomalous, highly stigmatized status of deviant and incompetent individuals. Third register is political: here dependency means subjection to an external ruling power and may be predicated of a colony or of a subject caste of non-citizen resident. Like the second register, in the political register, dependency's meaning as subjection to an external governing power has remained relatively constant, but its evaluative connotations worsen as individual political rights and national sovereignty became normative. They say that with the emergence of a newer moral/psychological register, properties once ascribed to social relations came to be posited instead as inherent character traits of individuals or groups, and the connotations here, too, have worsen. This last register now claims an increasingly large proportion of discourse, as if the social relations of dependency were being absorbed into personality.

The writers say that in preindustrial English usage, the most common meaning of dependency was subordination. The economic, socio-legal, and political registers were relatively undifferentiated, reflecting the fusion of various forms of hierarchy in state and society, and moral/psychologically use of the term barely existed. Dependency, therefore, was a normal as opposed to a deviant condition, a social relation as opposed to an individual trait. Thus, it did not carry any moral disgrace. Nevertheless, dependency did mean status inferiority and legal coverture, being a part of a unit headed by someone else who had legal standing. Dependency also had what we would today call political consequences. While the term did not mean precisely unfree, its context was a social order in which subjection, not citizenship, was the norm. Independence connoted unusual privilege and superiority, as in freedom from labour. Thus, throughout most of the European development of representative government, independence in the sense of property ownership was a prerequisite for political rights. When dependence began to claim rights and liberty, they immediately became revolutionaries. Dependency was not then applied uniquely to characterize the relation of a wife to her husband. Women's dependency, like children's, meant being on a lower rung in a long social ladder; their husbands and fathers were above them but below others. For the agrarian majority, moreover, there was no implication of women's unilateral economic dependency because their labour, like that of children was recognized as essential to the family economy; the women were economic dependents only in the sense that the men of their class were as well. Thus generally women's dependency in preindustrial society was less gender-specific than it later became; it was similar in kind to that of subordinate men. But it was same for the lives of children, servants,

and the elderly overlaid with multiple layers of dependency.

Nevertheless, dependency was not universally approved or uncontested. It was subject, rather to principled challenges from at the 17th century on when liberal-individualist political arguments became common.

The writers further say that with the rise of industrial capitalism, the semantic geography of dependency shifted significantly. In the 18th and 19th centuries, **independence**, not **dependence** figured centrally in political and economic discourse, and its meanings were radically democratized. What in preindustrial society had been a normal and unstigmatized condition became deviant and stigmatized. More precisely, certain dependencies became shameful while others were deemed natural and proper. Likewise, emergent racial constructions made some forms of dependency appropriate for the "dark races", but intolerable for "whites". Such differentiated valuations became possible as the term's preindustrial unity fractured. No longer designating only generalized subordination, **dependency** in the industrial era could be socio-legal or political or economic. With these distinctions came another major semantic shift: now **dependency** need not always refer to a social relation; it could also designate an individual character trait. Thus, the moral/psychological register was born. These redefinitions were greatly influenced by Radical Protestantism, which elaborated a new positive image of individual independence and a critique of socio-legal and political dependency.

Changes in the civil and political landscape of dependence and independence were accompanied by even more dramatic changes in the economic register. When white workingmen demanded civil and electoral rights, they claimed to be independent. This entailed reinterpreting the meaning of wage labour so as to divest it of the association with dependency. That in turn required a shift in focus - from the experience or means of labour (e.g., ownership of tools or land, control of skills, and the organization of work) to its remuneration and how that was spent.

This shift in the meaning of independence also transformed the meaning of dependency. A wage labour became increasingly normative - and increasingly definitive of independence - it was precisely those excluded from wage labour who appeared to personify dependency. In the new industrial semantics, there emerged three principal icons of dependency, all effectively negatives of the dominant image of "the workers", and each embodying a different aspect of non-independence.

The first icon of industrial dependency was "the pauper", who lived not on wages but on poor relief. Paupers were not simply poor but degraded, their character corrupted and their will sapped through reliance on charity. To be sure, the moral/psychological condition of pauperism was related to the economic condition of poverty, but the relationship was not simple, but complex. While nineteenth-century charity experts acknowledged that poverty could contribute to pauperization, they also held that character defects could cause poverty. To be a pauper was not to be subordinate within a system of productive labour; it was to be outside such a system altogether.

A second icon of industrial dependency was embodied alternately in the figures of "the colonial native" and "the slave". They, of course, were very much inside the economic system, their labour often fundamental to the development of capital and industry. Whereas the pauper represented the characterological distillation of economic dependency, natives and slaves personified political subjection. There emerged a drift from an older sense of dependency as a relation of subjection imposed by an imperial power on an indigenous population to a newer sense of dependency as an inherent property or character trait of the people so subjected. In earlier usage, colonials were dependent because they had been conquered; in 19th century imperialist culture, they were conquered because they were dependent. In this new conception, it was the intrinsic, essential dependency of natives and slaves that justified their colonization and enslavement. The dependency of the native and the slave, like that of the pauper, was elaborated largely in the moral/psychological register.

The writers say that these shifts in the semantics of dependency reflect some major socio-historical developments. One is the progressive differentiation of the official economy---that which is counted in the domestic national product---as a seemingly autonomous system that dominates social life. Before the rise of capitalism, all forms work were woven into a net of dependency, which constituted a single, continuous fabric of social hierarchies. The whole set of relations were constrained by moral understandings, as in the preindustrial idea of a moral economy. In the patriarchal families and communities that characterized the

preindustrial period, women were subordinated and their labour often controlled by others, but their labour was visible, understood, and valued. With emergence of religious and secular individualism, on the one hand, and of industrial capitalism, on the other, a sharp, new dichotomy was constructed in which economic dependency and economic independence were unalterably opposed to one another. A crucial corollary of this dependence/independence dichotomy, and of the hegemony of wage labour in general, was the occlusion and devaluation of women's unwaged domestic and parenting labour.

The genealogy of dependency also expresses the modern emphasis on individual personality. This is the deepest meaning of the spectacular rise of the moral/psychological register, which constructs yet another version of the independence/dependence dichotomy. In the moral/psychological version, social relations are hypostatized as properties of individuals or groups. Fear of dependency, both explicit and implicit, posits and ideal, independent personality in contrast to which those considered dependent are deviant. This contrast bears traces of a sexual division of labour that assigns men primary responsibility as providers or breadwinners and women primary responsibility as caretakers and nurturers and then treats the derivative personality patterns as fundamental. It is as if male breadwinners absorbed into their personalities the independence associated with their ideologically interpreted economic role, whereas the persons of female nurturers became saturated with the dependency of those for whom they care. In this way, the opposition between the independent personality and the dependent personality maps onto a whole series of hierarchical oppositions and dichotomies that are central in modern capitalist culture: masculine/feminine, public/private, work/care, success/love, individual/community, economy/family, and competitive/self-sacrificing.

A genealogy cannot tell us how to respond politically to today's discourse about welfare dependency. It does suggest, however, the limits of any response that presupposes rather than challenges the definition of the problem that is implicit in that expression. An adequate response would need to question our received valuations and definitions of dependence and independence in order to allow new, emancipator social visions to emerge. Some contemporary welfare rights activists adopt this strategy, continuing the NWRO tradition. Pat Gowens, for example elaborates a feminist reinterpretation of dependency:

The vast majority of *all classes and all educational levels* "depends" on another income. It may come from child support ... or from a husband who earns \$20,000 while she averages \$7,000. But "dependence" more accurately defines dads who count on women's unwaged labour to raise children and care for the home. Surely, "dependence" doesn't define the single mom who does it all: childrearing, homemaking and bringing in the money (one way or another). When care giving is valued and paid, when dependence is not dirty word, and interdependence is the norm---only then will we make a dent in poverty.

Chapter 4

After the Family Wage - A Postindustrial Thought Experiment

In this chapter, Nancy Fraser says that the key is to modernize the obsolete underpinnings of current arrangements-especially the presupposition of long-lasting, male-headed nuclear families, in which well-paid, securely employed husbands support non-employed or low-earning wives. This assumption, which descends from industrial capitalism and still supports the social policy, is widely askew of post-industrial realities; the co-existence of diverse family forms, increased divorce and no-marriage, wide-spread female participation in waged work, and more precarious employment for all. She says that it must give way, in the welfare state of the future, to arrangements that can institutionalize gender justice.

Putting a question as to what should a postindustrial welfare state look like, Fraser says that "After the Family Wage" evaluates two alternative scenarios, each of which qualifies as feminist. In the first scenario, the age of the family wage would give way to the age of the "Universal Breadwinner". She says that presupposed by liberals and "equality feminists", this approach would guarantee social security chiefly by facilitating women's wage-earning - above all, by reforming labour markets and providing employment-enabling services such as day care, and elder care. In the second scenario, the era of the family wage would give way to the era of "Caregiver Parity". Favoured by conservatives and "difference feminists", this approach would support informal care-work in families, especially through caregiver allowances. Elaborating further, Nancy says that these approaches assume divergent conception of gender justice; whereas the first aims to conform women's lives

to the way men's lives are supposed to be now, the second approach would elevate care giving to parity with breadwinning in order to "make difference costless". Yet, she argues that neither approach is wholly satisfactory because, whereas the Universal Breadwinner model penalizes women for not being like men, the Caregiver Parity model relegates them to an inferior "mommy track". Therefore, Nancy argues that feminists should develop a third model called "Universal Caregiver" which would induce men to become more like women are now, meaning that people who combine employment with responsibilities for primary care-giving. She further says that treating women's current life patterns as the norm, this model would aim to overcome the separation of breadwinning and care-work. Thus avoiding both the workerism of Universal Breadwinner and the domestic privatism of Caregiver Parity, it aims to provide gender justice and security for all.

As far as the crisis of the welfare state is concerned, Nancy Fraser says that it has many roots - global economic trend, massive movements of refugees and immigrants, popular hostility to taxes, the weakening of the trade unions and labour parties, the rise of national and "racial-ethnic" antagonisms, the decline of solidaristic ideologies, and the collapse of state socialism. One absolutely crucial factor, however, she says is the crumbling of the old gender order. Existing welfare states are premised on assumptions about gender that are increasingly out of phase with many people's lives and self-understandings. As a result, they do not provide adequate social protections, especially for women and children.

The gender order that is now disappearing descends from the industrial era of capitalism and reflects the social world of its origin. It was centred on the ideal of the family wage. In this world people were supposed to be organized into heterosexual, male-headed nuclear families, which lived principally from the man's labour market earnings. The male head of the household would be paid a family wage, sufficient to support children and a wife-and-mother, who performed domestic labour without pay. Of course, countless lives never fit this pattern. Still, it provides the normative picture of a proper family.

The family-wage ideal was inscribed in the structure of most industrial-era welfare states. That structure has three tiers, with social-insurance programmes occupying the first rank. Designed to protect people from the vagaries of the labour market, these programmes replace the breadwinner's wage in case of sickness, disability, unemployment, or old-age. Many countries also featured a second tier of programmes, providing direct support for full-time female homemaking and mothering. A third tier served the "residuum". Largely a holdover from traditional poor relief, public assistance programme provided paltry, stigmatized, means-tested aid to needy people who had no claim to honourable support because they did not fit the family-wage scenario.

The writer further says that today, however, the family-wage assumption is no longer tenable --- either empirically or normatively. We are currently experiencing the death throes of the old, industrial gender order with the transition to a new, postindustrial phase of capitalism. The crisis of the welfare state is bound up with these epochal changes. It is rooted in part in the collapse of the world of the family wage, and of its central assumptions about labour markets and families.

The writer points out that in the labour markets of postindustrial capitalism, few jobs pay wages sufficient to support a family single-handedly; many, in fact, are temporary or part-time and do not carry standard benefits. Women's employment is increasingly common, moreover - although far less well-paid than men's. Postindustrial families, meanwhile, are less conventional and more diverse. Heterosexuals are marrying less and later, and divorcing more and sooner, while gays and lesbians are pioneering new kinds of domestic arrangements. Gender norms and family forms are highly contested. Thanks in part to the feminist and gay-and-lesbian liberation movements many people no longer prefer the male breadwinner/female homemaker model. One result of these trends is a steep increase in solo-mother families: growing numbers of women, both divorced and never married, are struggling to support themselves and their families without access to a male breadwinner's wage. Therefore, their families have high rates of poverty.

In short, a new world of economic production and social reproduction is emerging - a world of less stable employment and more diverse families. Though no one can be certain about its ultimate shape, this much seems clear: the emerging world, no less than the world of the family wage, will require a welfare state that effectively ensures people against uncertainties. It is clear, too, the old form of welfare state, built on assumptions of male-headed families and relatively stable jobs, are no longer suited to providing this protection. We need

something new, a postindustrial welfare state suited to radically new conditions of employment and reproduction. The writer then questions: "What, then, should a postindustrial welfare state look like"? She says that conservatives have lately had a lot to say about "restructuring the welfare state", but their vision is counter-historical and contradictory; they seek to reinstate the male breadwinner/female homemaker family for the middle class, while demanding that poor single mothers "work". Neoliberal proposals have recently emerged in the United States but they, too, are inadequate in the current context. Punitive, androcentric, and obsessed with employment despite the absence of good jobs, they are unable to provide security in a postindustrial world. Both these approaches ignore one crucial thing: A postindustrial welfare state, like its industrial predecessor must support a gender order that can be acceptable today, is one premised on gender justices. Feminists, therefore, are in good position to generate an emancipator vision for the coming period.

To date, however, feminists have tended to shy away from systematic reconstructive thinking about the welfare state. Nor have we yet developed a satisfactory account of gender justice that can inform an emancipator vision. We now need to undertake such thinking. We should ask: What new, postindustrial gender order should replace the family wage? And what sort of welfare state can best capture our highest aspirations? And what vision of social welfare comes closest to embodying it?

Further, the writer says that her discussion proceeds in four parts. In a first section, she proposes an analysis of gender justice that generates a set of evaluative standards. Then, in the second and third sections, she applies those standards to Universal Breadwinner and Caregiver Parity, respectively. In the fourth section, she concludes that neither of those approaches, even in an idealized form, can deliver full gender justice. She says that we must develop a new vision of a postindustrial welfare state, which effectively dismantles the gender division of labour.

In the chapter titled 'Gender Justice: A Complex Conception', she says that feminists have so far associated gender justice with either equality or difference, where "equality" means treating women exactly like men, and where "difference" means treating women differently in so far as they differ from men. Theorists have debated the relative merits of these two approaches as if they represented two antithetical poles of an absolute dichotomy. These arguments have generally ended in stalemate.

Feminists have responded to this stalemate in several different ways. Some have tried to resolve the dilemma by reconceiving one or another of its horns; they have reinterpreted difference or equality in what they consider a more defensible form. Others have concluded "a plague on both your houses" and sought some third, wholly other, normative principle. Still others have tried to embrace the dilemma as an enabling paradox, a resource to be treasured, not an impasse to be gotten around. Many feminists, finally, have retreated altogether from normative theorizing - into cultural positivism, piecemeal reformists, or postmodern antinomianism.

Nancy Fraser says that none of these responses is satisfactory and then says that normative theorizing remains an indispensable intellectual enterprise for feminism, indeed for all emancipator social movements. We need a vision or picture of where we are trying to go and a set of standards for evaluating various proposals as to how we might get there. The equality/difference impasse is real, moreover, and cannot be simply sidestepped or embraced. Nor is there any "wholly other", the third term that can magically catapult us, beyond it. She asks, what should feminist theorists do then?

She proposes that we reconceptualize gender justice as a complex idea, not a simple one. This means breaking with the assumption that gender justice can be identified with any single value or norm, whether it be equality, difference, or something else. Instead, we should treat it as a complex notion comprising a plurality of distinct normative principles. This plurality will include some notions associated with equality side of the debate, as well as some associated with the difference side. It will also encompass still other normative ideas that neither side has accorded due weight. Wherever they come from, however, the important point is this: each of several distinct norms must be respected simultaneously in order that gender justice be achieved. Failure to satisfy any one of them means failure to realize the full meaning of gender justice.

And here she proposes an account of gender justice that is designed for the specific purpose of evaluating alternative pictures of a postindustrial welfare state. She believes that the general idea of treating gender

justice as a complex conception is widely applicable. She says that the analysis here may serve as a paradigm case demonstrating the usefulness of this approach.

The writer unpacks the idea of gender justice as a compound of seven distinct normative principles:

1. *The anti-Poverty Principle*: The first and most obvious objective of social-welfare provision is to prevent poverty. Preventing poverty is crucial to achieving gender justice now after the family wage, given the high rates of poverty in solo-mother families. If it accomplishes nothing else, a welfare state should at least relieve suffering by meeting otherwise unmet basic needs. Any postindustrial welfare state that prevented poverty would constitute a major advance. So far, however, this does not say enough. The anti-poverty principle might be satisfied in a variety of different ways, not all of which are acceptable. Some ways, such as the provision of targeted, isolating, and stigmatized poor relief for solo-mother families, fail to respect several of the following normative principles, which are also essential to gender justice in social welfare.

2. *The Anti-Exploitation Principle*: Anti-poverty measures are important not only in themselves but also as a means to another basic objective: preventing exploitation of vulnerable people. This principle, too, is central to achieving gender justice after the family wage. Needy women with no other way to feed themselves and their children, for example, are liable to exploitation - by abusive husbands, by sweatshop foremen, and by pimps. In guaranteeing relief of poverty, then, welfare provision should also aim to mitigate exploitable dependency. The non-employed wife who knows she can support herself and her children outside of her marriage has more leverage within it; her "voice" is enhanced as her possibilities of "exit" increase. The same holds for the low-paid nursing-home attendant in relation to her boss. For welfare measures to have this effect, however, support must be provided as a matter of right. When receipt of aid is highly stigmatized or discretionary, the anti-exploitation principle is not satisfied.

The Three Equality Principles: A postindustrial welfare state could prevent women's poverty and exploitation and yet tolerate severe gender inequality. Such a welfare state is not satisfactory. A further dimension of gender justice in social provision is redistribution, reducing inequality between women and men. Some feminists, as we saw, have criticized equality; they have argued that it entails treating women exactly like men according to male-defined standards, and that this necessarily disadvantages women.

3. *Income Equality*: One form of equality that is crucial to gender justice concerns the distribution of real per capita income. This sort of equality is highly pressing now, after the family wage, when US women's earnings are approximately 70 percent of men's, when much of women's labour is not compensated at all, and when many women suffer from "hidden poverty" due to unequal distribution within families. The income-equality principle requires a substantial reduction in the vast discrepancy between men's and women's incomes. In so doing, it tends, as well, to help equalize the life-chances of children, as a majority of US children are currently likely to live at some point in solo-mother families.

4. *Leisure-Time Equality*: Another kind of equality is crucial to gender justice concerns the distribution of leisure time. This sort of equality is highly pressing now, after the family wage, when many women, but relatively few men, do both paid work and unpaid primary care-work and when women suffer disproportionately from "time poverty". The leisure-time-equality principle rules out welfare arrangements that would equalize incomes while requiring double shift of work from women, but only a single shift from men.

5. *Equality of Respect*: Equality of respect is also crucial to gender justice. This kind of equality is especially pressing now, after the family wage, when postindustrial culture routinely represents women as sexual objects for the pleasure of male subjects. The principle of equal respect rules out social arrangements that objectify and deprecate women - even if those arrangements prevent poverty and exploitation, and even if in addition they equalize income and leisure time. It is incompatible with welfare programmes that trivialize women's activities and ignore women's contributions - hence with "welfare reform".

A postindustrial welfare state should promote equality in all three of these dimensions. Such a state would constitute an enormous advance over present arrangements, but even it might not go far enough. Some ways of satisfying the equality principles would fail to respect the following principle, which is also essential to gender justice in social welfare.

6. *The Anti-Marginalization Principle*: A welfare state could satisfy all the preceding principles and still function to marginalize women. By limiting support to generous mothers' pensions, for example, it could render women independent, well provided for, well rested, and respected, but enclaved in a separate domestic sphere, removed from the life of the larger society. Such a welfare state would be unacceptable. Social policy should promote women's full participation on a par with men in all areas of social life - in employment, in politics, in the associational life of civil society. The anti-marginalization principle requires provision of the necessary conditions for women's participation, including day care, elder care, and provision for breast-feeding in public. It also requires the dismantling of masculinist work cultures and women-hostile political environments.
7. *The Anti-Androcentrism Principle*: A welfare state that satisfied many of the foregoing principles could still entrench some obnoxious gender norms. It could assume the androcentric view that men's current life-patterns represent the human norm and that women ought to assimilate to them. (This is the real issue behind the previously noted worry about equality). Such a welfare state is unacceptable. Social policy should not require women to become like men, nor to fit into institutions designed for men, in order to enjoy comparable levels of well-being. Policy should aim instead to restructure androcentric institutions so as to welcome human beings who can give birth and who often care for relatives and friends, treating them not as exceptions, but as ideal-typical participants. The anti-androcentrism principle requires decentering masculinist norms - in part by revaluing practices and traits that are currently undervalued because they are associated with women. It entails changing men as well as changing women.

Here, then, is an account of gender justice in social welfare. On this account, gender justice is a complex idea comprising seven distinct normative principles, each of which is necessary and essential. No postindustrial welfare state can realize gender justice unless it satisfies them all.

The writer says that gender is the principle focus of this chapter, to be sure, but it cannot be treated *en bloc*. The lives women and men are cross-cut by several other salient social divisions, including class, "race"-ethnicity, sexuality, and age. Models of postindustrial welfare states, then, will not affect all women - not all men - in the same way; they will generate different outcomes for differently situated people.

In the end, Nancy Fraser concludes that, in general, the chapters comprising Part I advance a radical critique of the welfare state from a feminist perspective. Exuding an optimistic sense of expansive possibility, these chapters assumed that feminist movements could help to remake the world, dissolving male-supremacist structures and overturning gender hierarchies. She says that simultaneously presupposing and radicalizing the socialist imaginary, they validate the efforts of second-wave feminists to expand the political agenda beyond the confines of social democracy. Repudiating welfare paternalism, they shift the focus of critical scrutiny from class distribution to gender in justice broadly conceived. Whether critical or constructive, these chapters seek to render visible, and criticizable the entire panoply of structures and practices that prevent women from participating on par with men in social life.

PART TWO

The chapters included in this part map the shift from early second-wave feminism to identity politics. Interrogating various currents of feminist theorizing, they document the process by which the cultural turn seemed to swallow up political economy, even though it should have enriched it. In addition, these chapters track the growing centrality of claims for recognition within feminist activism. Situating those claims in historical context, they dissect the fateful co-incidence of the rise of identity politics with the revival of free market fundamentalism; and they analyze the dilemmas feminists face as a result. In a general term Part two diagnoses the shrinking of emancipatory vision. Seeking to dispel the mystique of cultural feminism, these chapters aim to retrieve the best insights of socialist-feminism and to combine them with a non-identitarian version of the politics of recognition. The writer says that only such an approach can meet the intellectual and political challenges facing feminist movements in a period of neoliberal hegemony.

Chapter 5

Feminism Tamed from Redistribution to Recognition in the Age of Identity

"Against Symbolism" (1990) scrutinizes one influential current of theorizing that unwittingly helped to divert

the feminist imagination into culturalist channels. On its face, of course, nothing could be more opposed to identity politics than Lacanian psychoanalysis, which associates the wish for a stable identity with a devalored "imaginary register". Nevertheless, as the writer argues here, feminist efforts to appropriate that theoretical paradigm inadvertently understand their own professed anti-essentialism by failing to challenge some basic assumptions of Lacanian thought. Moreover, and equally unfortunate, by slighting political economy and avoiding institutional analysis, they ended up colluding with cultural feminists in making language and subjectivity the privileged foci of feminist critique.

"Against Symbolism" discloses the self-defeating character of Lacanian feminism. Building on my earlier efforts to theorize the discursive dimension of women's subordination, this chapter assesses the relative merits of two ideal-typical approaches to signification; a structuralist approach, which analyzes symbolic systems or codes, and a pragmatic approach, which studies speech as a social practice. If one's goal is to analyze the workings of gender domination in capitalist societies and to clarify the prospects for overcoming it, then the pragmatic approach has more to offer.

Chapter 6

Feminist Politics in the Age of Recognition (2001)

This chapter charts the progressive uncoupling of recognition from redistribution in feminist theorizing and feminist politics. Troubled by the prevalence of one-sided, culturalist feminisms, this essay proposes to marry the best insights of the cultural turn with the nearly forgotten but still indispensable insights of socialist-feminism. Rejecting sectarian constructions that cast those perspectives as mutually incompatible, she analyzes sexism as a two-dimensional mode of subordination, rooted simultaneously in the political economy and status order of capitalist society. Overcoming gender subordination, she argues, requires combining a feminist politics of recognition with a feminist politics of redistribution.

Developing such a politics is not easy, however, as gender cuts across other axes of subordination, and claims for gender justice can conflict with other presumptively legitimate claims, such as claims for minority cultural recognition. It follows that feminists should eschew "single-variable" perspectives, which focus on gender alone, in favour of approaches that can handle hard cases, where injustices intersect and claims collide.

In general, Part two assesses the state of the feminist imagination in a time of rising neoliberalism. Analyzing the shift from early second-wave feminism, which sought to engender the socialist imaginary, to identity politics, which jettisoned the latter in favour of a politics centered on recognition, these essays provide a sober accounting of the losses and gains. Leery of identity politics in a period of neoliberal hegemony, they aim to revive the project of egalitarian gender redistribution in combination with a de-reified politics of recognition. The goal throughout is to develop new conceptual and practical strategies for combating gender injustices of economy and culture simultaneously.

PART THREE

Feminism Resurgent? Confronting Capitalist Crisis in the Neoliberal Era

Part three shifts the scene to the present. Today, when neo-liberalism is everywhere in crisis, reductive culturalism is widely discredited, and feminist interest in political economy is fast reviving. What is needed now, Nancy Fraser says, is a gender sensitive framework that can grasp the fundamental character of the crisis as well as the prospects for an emancipator resolution. One imperative is to conceptualize the multilayer nature of the current crisis, which encompasses simultaneous destabilizations of finance, ecology and social reproduction. Another is to map the grammar of the social struggles that are responding to crisis and reshaping the political terrain on which feminists operate. Crucial to both enterprises is the new salience of transnationalizing forces, which are problematizing "the Westphalian frame": that is, the previously unquestioned idea that the bounded territorial state is the appropriate unit for reflecting on, and struggling for justice. Thus, many of the assumptions that supported earlier feminist projects are being called into question.

The chapters falling under Part-III aim to develop models of feminist theorizing that can clarify this situation.

Chapter 8

Reframing Justice in a Globalizing World (2008)

This chapter observes that so called "globalization" is changing the grammar of political claims-making. In this

context, Nancy Fraser says that contests that used to focus chiefly on the question of what is owed as a matter of justice to members of political communities now turned quickly into dispute about who should count as a member and which is the relevant community. Not only the substance of justice but also the *frame* is in dispute. The result is a major challenge to received understandings, which fail to ponder *who should count* in matters of justice. To meet the challenge, she says, the theory of justice must become three-dimensional, incorporating the political dimension of representation alongside the economic dimension of distribution and the cultural dimension of recognition. This chapter constitutes a major revision of the model developed in the previous chapters. Adapting Webers triad of class, status, and party, it identifies not two but three analytically distinct kinds of obstacles to parity of participation in capitalist societies.

Whereas distribution foregrounds impediments rooted in political economy, and recognition discloses obstacles grounded in the status order, representation conceptualizes barriers to participatory parity that are entrenched in the political constitution of society. At issue here, Fraser says, are the procedures for staging and resolving conflicts over injustice. For example, how are claims for redistribution and recognition to be adjudicated? And who belongs to the circle of those who are entitled to raise them?

Nancy Fraser further says that directed at clarifying struggles over globalization, this third "political" dimension of justice operates on two different levels. On the one hand, "ordinary political injustices", which arise internally within a bounded political community, when skewed decision rules entrench disparities of political voice among fellow citizens. Feminist struggles for gender quotas on electoral lists are a response to sort of ordinary-political misrepresentation. She says that equally important, if less familiar, are "meta-political injustices", which arise when the division of political space into bounded polities miscasts what are actually transnational injustices as national matters. In this case, effected non-citizens are wrongly excluded from consideration - as, for example, when claims of the global poor are shunted into the domestic political arenas of weak or failed states and diverted from the offshore causes of their dispossession. Naming this second the meta-political injustice "misframing", Fraser argues for a post-Westphalian theory of democratic justice which problematizes unjust frames.

Elaborating further, Nancy says that in the heyday of social democracy, disputes about justice presumed a "Keynesian-Westphalian frame". Typically played out within modern territorial states, arguments about justice were assumed to concern relations among fellow citizens, to be subject to debate with national publics, and contemplate redress by national states. This was true for each of two major families of justice claims, like the claims the socio-economic redistribution and claims for legal or cultural recognition. At a time when the Britton Wood system facilitated Keynesian economic steering at the national level, claims for redistribution usually focused on economic inequities within territorial states. Similarly, in an era still gripped by a Westphalian political imaginary, which sharply distinguished "domestic" from "international" space, claims for recognition generally concerned internal status hierarchies. In both cases, the Keynesian-Westphalian frame was taken for granted. Whether the matter concerned redistribution or recognition, class differentials or status hierarchies, it went without saying that unit within which justice applied was the modern territorial state.

Fraser further says that although it went unnoticed at the time, the Keynesian-Westphalian frame gave a distinctive shape to arguments about social justice. The argument focused on what should count as a just ordering of social relations within a society. Engrossed in disputing the "what" of justice, the contestants apparently felt no need to dispute the "who". With the Keynesian-Westphalian frame securely in place, it went without saying that the "who" was the national citizenry.

The writer says that however, today, the Keynesian-Westphalian frame is losing its aura of self-evidence. Thanks to heightened awareness of globalization, many observers note that decision taken in one territorial state often impact the lives of those outside it, as do the actions of transnational corporations, international currency speculators, and large institutional investors. Many observers also note the growing salience of supranational and international organizations, both governmental and non-governmental, and of transnational public opinion, which flows with supreme disregard for borders through global mass media and cyber technology. The result is a new sense of vulnerability to transnational forces. Thus, under these conditions, the Keynesian-Westphalian frame, for many, has ceased to be axiomatic that the modern territorial state is

the appropriate unit for thinking about issues of justice. In today's world, claims for redistribution increasingly negate the assumption national economies. Faced with trans-nationalized production, the outsourcing of jobs, and the associated pressures of the "raised to the bottom", once nationally focused labour union look increasing for allies abroad. WTO protesters, occupying movements, and indignados directly target the new governance structures of the global economy, which have vastly strengthened the ability of large corporations and investors to escape the regulatory and taxation powers of territorial states. In the same way, movements struggling for recognition increasingly look beyond the territorial state.

Today, arguments about justice assumed a double guise. On the one hand, they concern first-order question of substance, just as before, like how much economic inequality does justice permit, how much redistribution is required, and according to which principle of distributive justice? But above and beyond such first-order question, arguments about justice today also concern second-order, meta-level question, like what is the proper frame within which to consider first-order question of justice? Who are the relevant subjects entitled to a just distribution or reciprocal recognition in the given case? Thus, it is not only the substance of justice, but also the frame, which is in dispute. The result, says the writer, is major challenge to our theories of social justice.

Nancy Fraser says that in order to resolve the problem as to who should count in matters of justice, she puts forward the view that the theory of justice must become three-dimensional, incorporating the political dimension of representation alongside the economic dimension of distribution and cultural dimension of recognition. She further says that adapting Weber's triad of class, status, and distinct parity, it identifies not two but three analytically distinct kinds of obstacles to parity of participation in capitalist societies. Whereas distribution foregrounds impediments rooted in political economy, and recognition discloses obstacles grounded in the status order, representation conceptualizes barriers to participatory parity that are entrenched in the political constitution of society. At issue here are the procedures for staging and resolving conflicts over injustice: How are claims for redistribution and recognition to be adjudicated? And who belongs to the circle of those who are entitled to raise them? She says that directed at clarifying struggles over globalization, this third "political" dimension of justice operates on two different levels. On the one hand, there are "ordinary-political injustices", which arise internally, within a bounded political community, when skewed decision rules entrench disparity of political voice among fellow citizens. Feminist struggles for gender quotas on electoral lists, she says, are a response to this sort of ordinary-political misrepresentation. Equally important, if less familiar are "meta-political injustices", which arise when the division of political space into bounded polities miscasts what are actually transnational injustices as national matters. She further says that in this case, effected non-citizens are wrongly excluded from consideration: as, for example, when the claims of the global poor are shunted into the domestic political arenas of weak or failed states and diverted from the off shore causes of their dispossession. Naming this second, meta-political injustice "mis-framing", Fraser argues for a post-Westphalian theory of democratic justice which problematizes unjust frames. She claims that the result is a major revision of her theory, aimed at addressing trans-border inequities in a globalizing world.

Chapter 9

Feminism, Capitalism, and Cunning of History

Nancy Fraser says that this chapter applies the revised, three-dimensional frame work to the historical trajectory of second-wave feminism. Effectively recapitulating the overall argument of this book, this chapter, written in 2009, situates the movement's unfolding in relation to three different moments in the history of capitalism. First, she locates the movement's beginnings in the context of "state-organized capitalism". Here, she charts the emergence of second-wave feminism from out of the anti-imperialist New Left as a radical challenge to the pervasive androcentrism of state-led capitalist societies in the post war era. She further identifies the movement's fundamental emancipatory promise with its expanded sense of injustice and its structural critique of capitalist society. Secondly, she considers the process of feminism's evolution in the dramatically changed social context of rising neoliberalism. In this chapter, she explores not only the movement's extraordinary successes but also the disturbing convergence of some of its ideals with the demands of an emerging new form of capitalism: post-Fordist, "disorganized", transnational. Fraser suggests that second-

wave feminism has unwittingly supplied a key ingredient of what Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello call "the new spirit of capitalism". Finally, Fraser contemplates prospects for reorienting feminism in the present context of capitalist prices, which could mark the beginnings of a shift to a new, post-neoliberal form of social organization. She says that she examines the prospects for reactivating feminism's emancipatory promise in world that has been rocked by financial crisis and the surrounding political fallout.

"Feminism, Capitalism, and the Cunning of History" constitutes a provocation of sorts. Contending that feminism has entered a dangerous liaison with neoliberalism, this chapter identifies four major historical ironies. First, the feminist critique of social-democratic economism, undeniably emancipator in the era of state-organized capitalism, has assumed a more sinister valence in the subsequent period, as it dovetailed with neoliberalism's interests in diverting political-economic struggles into culturalist channels. Second, the feminist critique of the "family wage", once the centerpiece of a radical analysis of capitalism's androcentrism, increasingly serve today to legitimate a new mode of capital accumulation, heavily dependent on women's waged labour, as idealized in the "two-earner family". Third, the feminist critique of welfare-state paternalism has converged unwittingly with neoliberalism's critique of the nanny state, and with its increasingly cynical embrace of micro-credit and NGOs. Finally, efforts to expand the scope of gender justice beyond the nation-state are increasingly resignified to stick together with neoliberalism's global governance needs, as "femocrats" have entered the policy apparatuses of the United Nations, the European Union, and the "international community". In every case, an idea that served emancipatory ends in one context became ambiguous, if not worse, in another. Now Nancy raises the question: "Where does this argument leave feminism today"?

The above chapter discusses these points in detail. Nancy Fraser, in this chapter, says that the current crisis of neoliberal capitalism is altering the landscape of feminist theory. During the last two decades, most theorists kept their distance from the sort of large-scale social theorizing associated with Marxism. Accepting the necessity of academic specialization, they settled on one or another branch of disciplinary inquiry, conceived as a freestanding enterprise. The critique of capitalist society - pivotal for earlier generations - all but vanished from the agenda of feminist theory. Critique centred on capitalist crisis was pronounced reductive and deterministic. However, today, she says such varieties lie in tatters. With the global financial system teetering, worldwide production and employment in freefall, and looming prospect of a prolonged recession, capitalist crisis supplies the inscapable backdrop for every serious attempt at critical theory. Henceforth, Fraser says, feminist theorists cannot avoid the question of capitalist society. Large-scale social theory, aimed at clarifying the nature and roots of crisis, as well as the prospects for an emancipatory resolution, promises to regain its place in feminist thought.

She herself replies in the final **chapter** titled **Between Marketization and Social Protection: Resolving the Feminist Ambivalence**

In this chapter she proposes a framework aimed at disrupting our dangerous liaison with neoliberalism and liberating our radical energies. Revising a landmark study of capitalist crisis, this chapter (2010) offers a feminist reading of Karl Polanyi's 1944 classic *The Great Transformation*. Eschewing economism, this book analyzed a previous crisis of capitalism as a crisis of social reproduction, as earlier efforts to create a "free market society" undermined the shared understandings and solidary relations that underpin social life. In Polanyi's view, such efforts proved to destructive of livelihoods, communities, and habitats as to trigger a century-long struggle between free-marketeers and proponents of "social protection", who sought to defend "society" from the ravages of the market. The end result of this struggle, which he called a "double movement", was fascism and World War II.

Nancy Fraser says that the thought of Karl Polanyi afford a promising starting point for such theorizing. His 1944 classic *The Great Transformation* elaborates an account of capitalist crisis as multifaceted historical process that began with the industrial revolution in Britain and proceeded, over the course of more than a century, to envelope the entire world, entraining imperial subjection, periodic depressions, and cataclysmic wars. For Polanyi, moreover, capitalist crisis was less about economic background in the narrow sense than about disintegrated communities, ruptured solidarities, and despoiled nature. Its roots lay less in intra-economic contradictions, such as the tendency of the rate of profit to fall, than in a momentous shift in the place of

economy vis-à-vis society. Overturning the heretofore universal relation, in which markets were embedded in social institutions and subject to moral and ethical norms, proponents of the "self-regulating market" sought to build a world in which society, morals, and ethics were subordinated to, indeed modeled on, markets. Conceiving labour, land, and money as "factors of production", they treated those fundamental bases of social life as if they were ordinary commodities and subjected them to market exchange. The effects of this "fictitious commodification", as Polanyi called it, were so destructive of habitats, livelihoods, and communities as to spark an ongoing counter-movements for the "protection of society".

She says that this is an account of capitalist crisis that transcends the cramped confines of economic thinking. Masterful, capacious, and encompassing action at multiple scales, *The Great Transformation* weaves together local protest, national politics, international affairs and global financial regimes in a powerful historical synthesis.

Of special interest to feminists, moreover, is the centrality of social reproduction in Polanyi's account. And capitalist crisis is in large part a social crisis, as untrammelled marketization endangers the fund of human capacities available to create and maintain social bonds. Because it foregrounds this social reproductive strand of capitalist crisis, Polanyi's thought resonates with recent feminist work on "social depletion" and the "crisis of care". His framework is capable, at least in principle, of embracing many feminist concerns.

These points alone would qualify Polanyi as a promising resource for feminists seeking to understand the travails of 21st century capitalist society. But there are other, more specific reasons for turning to him today. The story told in *The Great Transformation* has strong echoes in current developments. Certainly, there is a *prima facie* case for the view that the present crisis has its roots in recent efforts to disencumber markets from the regulatory regimes (both national and international) established in the aftermath of World War II. What we today call "neoliberalism" is nothing but the second coming of the very same 19th century faith in the "self-regulating market" that unleashed the capitalist crisis Polanyi chronicled. Now, as then, the effect is to despoil nature, rupture communities, and destroy livelihoods. Today, moreover, as in Polanyi's time, counter-movements are mobilizing to protect society and nature from the ravages of the market. Now, as then, struggles over nature, social reproduction, and global finance constitute the central nodes and flashpoints of crisis.

For many reasons, Polanyi's perspective holds considerable promise for theorizing today. Yet feminists should not rush to embrace it uncritically. Even as it overcomes economism, *The Great Transformation* turns out, on closer inspection, to be deeply flawed. Focused single-mindedly on harms emanating from disembedded markets, the book overlooks harms originating elsewhere, in the surrounding "society". Occulting non-market-based forms of injustice, it also tends to whitewash forms of social protection that are at the same time vehicles of domination. Focused overwhelmingly on struggles against market-based depredations, the book neglects struggles against injustices rooted in "society" and encoded in social protections.

Thus, feminist theorists should not embrace Polanyi's framework in the form in which it appears in *The Great Transformation*. What is needed, rather, is a revision of that framework. The goal should be a new, quasi-Polanyian conception of capitalist crisis that not only avoids reductive economism but also avoids romanticizing "society".

Seeking to develop a critique that comprehends "society" as well as "economy", Fraser proposes to broaden Polanyi's problematic to encompass a third historical project of social struggle that crosscuts his central conflict between marketization and social protection. She calls it "emancipation" which aims to overcome forms of subjection rooted in "society". The effect of introducing this missing third will be to transform the double movement into a triple movement, encompassing marketization, social protection, and emancipation. The triple movement will form the core of a new, quasi-Polanyian perspective that can clarify the stakes for feminists in the present capitalist crisis.

Polanyi distinguished two different relations in which markets can stand to society. On the one hand, markets can be "embedded", enmeshed in non-economic institutions and subject to non-economic norms, such as "the just price" and "the fair wage". On the other hand, markets can be "disembedded", freed from extra economic controls and governed immanently, by supply and demand. The first possibility, claims Polanyi, represents the

historical norm; throughout most of history, in otherwise disparate civilizations and in widely separated locales, markets have been subject to non-economic controls, which limit what can be bought and sold, by whom, and on what terms. The second possibility is historically anomalous; a nineteenth-century British invention, the "self-regulating market" was an utterly novel idea whose deployment, Polanyi contends, threatens the very fabric of human society.

For Polanyi, markets can never in fact be fully disembedded from the larger society. The attempt to make them so must inexorably fail. For one thing, markets can function properly only against a non-economic background of cultural understandings and solidary relations; attempts to disembed them destroy that background. For another, the attempt to establish "self-regulating markets" proves destructive of the fabric of society, provoking widespread demands for their social regulation. Far from enhancing social cooperation, then the project of disembedding markets inevitably triggers social crisis.

For Polanyi, capitalist crisis encompassed not only the efforts of commercial interests to disembed markets, but also the combined counter-efforts of rural landowners, urban workers, and other strata to defend "society" against "economy". For Polanyi, finally, it was the sharpening struggle between these two camps, the marketizers and the protectionists, that lent the distinctive shape of a "double movement" to the crisis.

In general, then, the distinction between embedded and disembedded markets is integral to all of Polanyi's central concepts, including society, protection, crisis, and the double movement. On its face, the distinction between embedded and disembedded markets has much to offer to feminist theorizing. For one thing, it points beyond economism, to an expansive understanding of capitalist crisis as a multifaceted historical process, as much social, political, and ecological as economic. For another, it points beyond functionalism, grasping crisis, not as an objective "system breakdown", but as an intersubjective process that includes the responses of social actors to perceived shifts in their situation and to one another.

Nevertheless, Fraser says that the evaluative subtext of Polanyi's categories is problematic. On the one hand, his account of embedded markets and social protections is far too rosy. Conversely, Polanyi's account of disembedding is far too dark. Having idealized society, it occludes the fact that, whatever their other effects, processes that disembed markets from oppressive protections contain an emancipator moment. Thus present day feminist theorists must revise this framework. Exposing the normative deficits of "society", as well as those of "economy", we must validate struggles against domination wherever it roots.

To this end, the writer proposes to draw on a resource not utilized by Polanyi, namely, the insights of feminist movements. Unmasking power asymmetries occluded by him, these movements exposed the predatory underside of the embedded markets he tended to idealize. Protesting protections that were also oppressions, they raised claims for emancipation.

To speak of emancipation is to introduce a category that does not appear in *The Great Transformation*. But the idea, and indeed the word, figured importantly throughout the period Polanyi chronicled. But my point is not simply to flag an omission. It is rather to note that struggles for emancipation directly challenged oppressive forms of social protection, while neither wholly condemning nor simply celebrating marketization. Had they been included, these movements would have destabilized the dualistic narrative schema of *The Great Transformation*. The effect would have been to explode the double movement.

The emancipation differs importantly from Polanyi's chief positive category, social protection in that whereas protection is opposed to exposure, emancipation is opposed to domination. While protection aims to shield "society" from the disintegrative effects of unregulated markets, emancipation aims to expose relations of domination wherever they root, in society as well as in economy. Whereas protection's highest values are social security, stability, and solidarity, emancipation's priority is non-domination. It would be wrong, however, to conclude that emancipation is always allied with marketization. If emancipation opposes domination, marketization opposes the extra-economic regulation of production and exchange, whether such regulation is meant to protect or to liberate.

It follows that struggles for emancipation do not map neatly onto either prong of Polanyi's double movement. Granted, such struggles appear, on occasion, to converge with marketization - as, for example, when they condemn as oppressive the very social protections that free-marketeters are seeking to eradicate. On other

occasions, however, they converge with protectionist projects - as, for example, when they denounce the oppressive effects of marketization. Aligned consistently neither with protection nor marketization, struggles for emancipation represent a third force that disrupts Polanyi's dualistic schema. To give such struggles their due requires us to revise his framework --- by transforming its double movement into a triple movement.

Fraser says that to explode feminist claims for emancipation explode the double movement by disclosing a specific way in which social protections can be oppressive: namely, in virtue of entrenching status hierarchies. Such protections deny some who are included in principle as members of society the social preconditions for full participation in social interaction.

The feminist critique of hierarchical protection runs through every stage of Polanyi's history, although it is never mentioned by him. During the mercantilist era, feminists like Mary Wollstonecraft criticized the traditional social arrangements that embedded markets. Condemning gender hierarchies entrenched in family, religion, law, and social custom, they demanded such fundamental prerequisites of participatory parity as an independent legal personality, religious freedom, education, the right to refuse sex, rights of custody in children, and the right to speak in public and to vote. During the *laissez-faire* period, feminists demanded equal access to the market. Exposing the latter's instrumentalization of sexist norms, they opposed protections that denied them the right to own property, sign contracts, control wages, practice professions, work the same hours and receive the same pay as men, all prerequisites of full participation in social life. During the post-WWII era, "second wave" feminists targeted the "public patriarchy" instituted by welfare states. Condemning social protections premised on "the family wage", they demanded equal pay for work of comparable worth, parity for care-giving and wage-earning in social entitlements, and an end to the gender division of labour, both paid and unpaid. In each of these epochs, feminists raised claims for emancipation, aimed at overcoming domination. The writer says that the conflict between marketization and social protection must be mediated by emancipation. Equally, conflicts between protection and emancipation must be mediated by marketization. In both cases, the dyad must be mediated by the third. To neglect the third is to distort the logic of capitalist crisis and of social movement.

Nancy Fraser says that so far she has been using the triple movement to explore the ambivalence of social protection. Now, however, she wants to turn the tables and use the triple movement to explore the ambivalences of emancipation. Thus, having just stressed the need to view conflicts between marketization and social protection as mediated by emancipation, a mediation Polanyi neglected, she wants to stress the need to view conflicts between protection and emancipation as mediated by marketization, a mediation that she believes has been neglected by important currents of the feminist movement.

She wants to analyze the current crisis by means of the figure of the triple movement, just as Polanyi used the double movement to understand the previous crisis. She says that for us, as for him, the point is to clarify prospects for a new wave of democratic re-embedding, stabilized by a global regime of political-economic regulation. For us, however, social protection must be envisioned in the light of emancipation. Thus, our task is to envision arrangements for re-embedding markets that simultaneously serve to overcome domination.

She begins by noting that, in our time, each prong of the triple movement has zealous exponents. Marketization is fervently championed by neoliberals. Social protection commands support in various forms, some savory, some unsavory --- from nationally oriented social democrats and trade-unionists to anti-immigrant populist movements, from neo-traditional religious movements to anti-globalization activists, from environmentalists to indigenous peoples. Emancipation fires the passions of various successors to the new social movements, including multiculturalists, international feminists, gay and lesbian liberationists, cosmopolitan democrats, human-rights activists, and proponents of global justice. It is the complex relations among these three types of projects that impress the shape of a triple movement on the present crisis of capitalist society.

She wants us to consider, now, the role of emancipatory projects within this constellation. Since, at least the 1960s, such movements have challenged oppressive aspects of social protection in Embedded Liberalism. Earlier, New Leftists exposed the oppressive character of bureaucratically organized welfare regimes, which disempower their ostensible beneficiaries. Likewise, anti-imperialists unmasked the oppressive character of First World social protections that were financed through unequal exchange, on the backs of ex-colonial

peoples. More recently, multiculturalists have disclosed the oppressive character of social protections premised on majority religious or majority ethno-cultural self-understandings, which penalize members of minority groups. Finally, and most important for my purposes here, second-wave feminists have exposed the oppressive character of social protections premised on gender hierarchies. In each case, the movement disclosed a type of domination and raised a corresponding claim for emancipation. Fraser says that neglecting the rise of neoliberalism, many second-wave feminists misunderstood their situation and misjudged the likely consequences of their actions. The result of their failure to mediated the conflict between emancipation and social protection with reference to marketization is even now shaping the course of capitalist crisis in the twenty-first century. Recalling that second-wave feminism targeted the gender-hierarchical character of social protections in the postwar welfare state in which feminists discerned traces of an older schema, inherited from before the War, known as the "the family wage". The schema envisioned the ideal-typical citizen as a breadwinner and a family man, whose wage was the principal, if not the sole, economic support of his family, and whose wife's wages, if any, were supplemental. Deeply gendered, this "family wage" ideal supplied a central portion of the ethical substance on which postwar welfare states drew to re-embed markets. Normalizing women's dependency, the resulting system of social protection compromised women's chances to participate fully, on a par with men, in social life. Institutionalizing androcentric understandings of family and work, it naturalized gender hierarchy and removed it from political contestation. Equally important, by valorizing waged work, Embedded Liberalism's mode of protection obscured the social importance of unwaged carework.

Such was the feminist critique of Embedded Liberalism. Politically and intellectually powerful, this critique was nonetheless ambivalent, capable of leading in either of two directions. Taken one way, the feminist critique of the family wage would aim to secure women's full access to an employment and to employment-linked entitlements on a par with men. In that case, it would tend to volarize wage labour and the androcentric ideal of individual independence, effectively devaluing unwaged carework, interdependence, and solidarity. Targeting the traditional gender ethos that was still serving to embed markets, a feminism of this sort could end up furthering their disembedding. Intentional or not, the effect could be to align the struggle against gender hierarchy with marketization.

In principle, however, the feminist critique of oppressive protection could develop in another way. Differently articulated, the feminist struggle for emancipation could align with the other pole of the triple movement, the pole of social protection. In this second scenario, the thrust of feminist critique would be to reject androcentric valuations, especially overvaluation of waged labour and the undervaluation of unwaged carework. Casting carework as a matter of public importance, the movement's thrust would be to re-envision social arrangements in a way that enable everyone - male or female --- to perform both sets of activities, without the strains that beset all such efforts today. Rejecting, too, the gender-coded opposition between dependence and independence, a pre-protectionist feminism would serve to break the spurious link between social hierarchy and the dependency that is a universal feature of the human condition. Valorizing solidarity and interdependence, the critique would work not to dissolve, but to transform social protection.

As a matter of fact, second-wave feminism encompassed both orientations. For the most part, so-called liberal and radical feminists gravitated in the direction of marketization, while socialist-feminists and feminists of colour were more likely to align with forces for social protection. In the first case, the alignment was not always intended. In the other case, by contrast, the alignment was relatively conscious. Feminists whose concerns dovetailed with protectionist forces tended to have an intuitive grasp of the logic of the triple movement. They were often aware that their struggle for emancipation intersected with another struggle, between protection and deregulation. Positioning themselves in a three-sided game, they sought to avoid abetting the forces of marketization, even while vigorously opposing oppressive protections.

Fraser says that feminist ambivalence has been resolved in recent years in favour of marketization. Insufficiently attuned to the rise of free-market fundamentalism, mainstream feminists have ended up supplying the rational for a new mode of capital accumulation, heavily dependent on women's wage labour. As women have streamed into labour markets across the globe, the ideal of the family wage is losing ground to the newer, more modern norm of the two-earner family. Certainly, the reality that underlies the new ideal is catastrophic

for many. But neoliberalism cloaks its depredations beneath an enchanting, charismatic veil: invoking the feminist critique of the family wage, it promises liberation through waged labour in the service of capital. Clearly, feminist ideas suffuse the experience of the female cadres of the professional middle classes, determined to crack the glass ceiling. Equally, however, they lend a higher meaning and moral point to the daily struggles of millions of female temps, part-timers, low-wage service workers, domestics, sex workers, migrants, EPZ (Export Processing Zones) workers, and micro-credit borrowers, who seek not only income and security, but also dignity, self-betterment, and liberation from traditional authority. In both cases, the dream of women's emancipation is harnessed to the engine of capital accumulation. Thus, feminism's critique of the family wage has assumed a marketizing valence. Once capable of aligning with social protection, it serves increasingly today to intensify neoliberalism's valorization of waged labour.

Now Nancy Fraser raises the question as to what should we conclude from this account? She says, certainly not that second-wave feminism has failed simpliciter. Nor that it is to blame for the triumph of neoliberalism. Surely not that struggles for emancipation are inherently problematic, always already doomed to be recuperated for marketizing projects. She concludes, rather, that we who aim to emancipate women from gender hierarchy need to become more aware that we operate on a terrain that is also populated by marketizing forces. Above all, we need to reckon with emancipation's inherent ambivalence, its capacity to go in either of two directions ---- to ally either with the forces of marketization or with those promoting social protection. Only by appreciating this ambivalence, and by anticipating its potential unintended effects, can we undertake collective political reflection on how we might best resolve it.

Provincializing Fraser's History: Feminism and Neoliberalism Revisited

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Bird's Eye View

In the document, the writers say that in "**Feminism, Capitalism and the Cunning of History**," published in the *New Left Review*, Nancy Fraser holds second-wave feminism responsible for having lost the integral, multi-dimensional approach that accounted for its power vis-à-vis capitalism and enabled it to struggle against political, economic, and social inequalities all at once. Representing the trajectory of feminism in relation to three different moments of capitalism (state-organized capitalism, neoliberalism, and the current crisis), Fraser goes far beyond assessing the relative failure of women in translating feminism's cultural successes into institutional changes. Despite passing comments here and there aimed at softening the tone, Fraser's text explicitly accuses second-wave feminism of inadvertently legitimizing the structural transformation of capitalism into neoliberalism. Feminist critiques of state-organized capitalism, she suggests, became cannon fodder for a post-Fordist, transnational, neoliberal system. The feminist critique of the family wage, for instance, called for flexible labor conditions, that deprived women of choice in the face of microcredit schemes designed to integrate them into the market. Feminism's critique of the welfare state was echoed in Margaret Thatcher's denunciation of the "nanny state." Macro-economic strategies to fight poverty, Fraser notes, have been abandoned in favour of NGO-based local activism. To oppose the historical cunning that makes second-wave feminism an affiliate of neoliberalism, Fraser invites the women's movement to engage in self-critique in order to reactivate its "emancipatory promise."

The writers point out that the soundness of this position is seriously marred by causal and empirical negligence. Fraser claims that the most significant

mistake committed by feminists is to have abandoned an integral systemic analysis, but she does not specify who did the abandoning, when, and under which circumstances. She speaks of the fragmentation of the movement, but the culprits remain unidentified. Thus, recent academic and practical work on feminist economics, participatory feminist budgeting or global strategic sisterhood is disregarded. So too are the processes and struggles that led to the Montreal Principles on Women's Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 2002. Most significantly, Fraser's explicit intent not to look at "this or that geographical slice of the movement, nor [at] this or that sociological stratum of women" results in a total neglect of the incredibly original, anti-systemic forms of resistance emerging from the global South. Therefore, even if Fraser's observations were true, it is of utmost importance to emphasize that they apply only to a specific fragment of the feminist movement and cannot be said to represent the whole. The writers further point out that another fundamental problem with the article involves Fraser's characterization of feminism. Fraser states that she will treat second-wave feminism as an "epochal social phenomenon". This approach, which allegedly establishes the general trajectory and historical weight of the feminist movement, is also expected to produce insights into the kind of feminist politics that are required in the future. But while assessing the conditions feminism is facing now, Fraser does not take into account the value of feminist politics as a critique of domination; the text reads as if she considers deficient those feminist demands that do not openly address economic issues. As such, Fraser risks becoming the target of her own criticism: she abandons an integral approach in favour of defending the centrality and indispensability of class struggle as the main and sole axis of anti-systemic opposition. Her purportedly analytical distinctions between the economic, the cultural, and the political eventually shed their conceptual character as the essay progresses until they turn into existential or structural essences. The idea that every social practice may be a junction where political, cultural, and economic processes intersect is noted, but not taken into account. Fraser thereby unwittingly denies the role that feminist politics has played in generating a particular anti-systemic ethos, even when its discourses do not directly address capitalism as such. They say that while she seems oblivious to how social democratic movements have played into the hands of economists eager to oppose Keynesianism with monetarism, Fraser minimizes the destabilizing impact that feminist struggles have had on global capitalist strategies.

Feminism or Feminisms?

The writers say that Fraser stands on particularly narrow empirical ground when she accuses the feminist movement of abandoning the ideal of the just and equitable distribution of material resources. One needs, however, to ask whether or not the absence of an integral systemic analysis can be attributed to the entire feminist movement, for there are very different forms of feminist practice; even if some actually deserve Fraser's critique, to claim that this is a global tendency is to disregard the differences between feminist movements in their cultural, political, and geographical contexts.

They further point out that Fraser's use of the generic term, "feminists," is reminiscent of the notion of imagined community that Chandra Mohanty borrows from Benedict Anderson to depict the feminist movement. According to Mohanty, as an imagined community, the global feminist movement may imply solidarity and unity, but the very act of defining such a community may also involve exclusion, hierarchy, and political disagreement. Similarly, when Fraser speaks of the feminist movement, she gives the impression that she has women's movements of the northern middle classes in mind such that they constitute the entire content of her "closed community," as Allison M. Jagger would put it. By unwittingly universalizing this experience, she ends up excluding feminist voices raised in other parts of the world. It must also be said that her account does not even acknowledge women's struggles taking place in the lower strata of societies in the North.

The writers say that this oversight actually reads like a repetition of the history of second-wave feminism itself. Second-wave feminism was initiated by white, middle-class women, but was subjected to criticism after the inclusion of black women and women from the so-called third world into its midst. The women on the periphery managed to convince their sisters from the center of the inextricability of women's experiences from issues of class, race, and ethnicity, but only after innumerable disputes and confrontations. By abstracting the feminist movement from its historical and social context to present it as a transnational universal experience,

Fraser leaves out the (sometimes bitter) acquis of decades of activism, dispute, and negotiation. This produces an analysis that exaggerates the global effects of northern feminism and depicts the movement as one of the stepping stones in the transition from state-organized capitalism to neoliberalism.

They further say, having read Fraser's article, one ends up thinking that feminist activists and academics have totally abandoned the critique of market-based employment opportunities for women. This comes as a surprise, even more so when feminists today are spending considerable effort to reveal how neoliberalism is a gendered formation, how neoliberal social processes have different effects on men and women, and how they produce new power relations for gender identities. Feminist economists have attempted not only to question neoliberal macroeconomic processes, but also to develop economic theories that seek solutions to inequalities and to the socio-economic conditions that women face.

The writers further point out that the rights-based perspective has been criticized for reducing the economic rights discourse solely to women's employment in the formal sector, and for assuming that jobs automatically empower women. These critics shed light on new forms of exploitation to which women are subjected by joining the workforce. For instance, in an article published in the *Feminist Review* in 1981, Ruth Pearson and Diane Elson argued that struggling for female employment is not enough. They demonstrated that increased job opportunities did not automatically lead to improving women's subordinate positions. One should rather investigate how women are integrated into the development process and evaluate "the new possibilities and the new problems which they raise for third world women who work in them."

Today, many feminist activists and academics are discussing the plight of Chinese, Latino, Romanian, Russian, Indonesian, Filipino, and Mexican women who have taken over the domestic responsibilities of white middle-class women because the latter have now joined the workforce. They are problematizing the ways in which this has created new hierarchies among women, and the ways in which care work has been commodified beyond national borders. Immigrant or ethnic minority women tend to enter the workforce in the post-industrial capitalist societies of the North by being employed in the service sector as nannies, maids, or sex workers. Their labor mostly enables upper-class white women to work in well-paid jobs and provides them the leisure to participate in capitalist consumption. Feminists who have observed that the salaries and working conditions of immigrant women are determined at the intersections of race, class, and gender suggest just how hollow ideals of Working-class or female solidarity may be when such issues are left out of the analyses." Many feminist studies are critical of how women become sexual slaves in the global market and how women employed in sweatshops are made to compete with their sisters in other countries.

Thus, they argue, Fraser's romantic view of wage work, in which she accuses feminists of embracing the masculinist ideal of the "free, unencumbered, self-fashioning individual" will simply not do. The "inter-sectionist" alternative that Fraser notes as one of the achievements of feminism is not a mere cultural feat; it involves bitter power struggles with fundamental elements of the hegemonic system and often requires confronting one's own prejudices as well as those of others.

But again, neoliberalism is such an ambivalent economic system that it constantly produces dilemmas to which no purely principled solution may be found. Among them is one that Naila Kabeer points out. The social clause that sees to the application of global labor standards in poor countries through international trade agreements goes against the interests of women working in difficult conditions: "" In other words, what looks like a universally valid and acceptable principle in the North might not produce the win-win situation it promises in the South, especially when it reduces job opportunities available to lower-class women?

The writers say that whether or not women's employment may be subjected to the same analyses and assessments all over the world is being boldly debated in work by a growing number of feminists. The introduction to a special issue of *Feminist Economics* in 2000 on gender and globalization cites studies showing how employment opportunities have increased for women in Southeast Asia, how women's education levels are on the rise and how wage differences between men and women on the decline." But the fact that men and women are contributing jointly to growth and welfare does not rule out the possibility that other forms of inequality are on the rise. For instance, in *The End of Capitalism (As We Knew It)*, one of the most

impressive attempts to articulate feminism with post-structuralist Marxism, J.K. Gibson-Graham emphasize that construing globalizing capitalism as a unitary structure with an essential logic poses an obstacle for the women's movement. The complexity that Gibson-Graham wish to underline is clearly revealed in scholarly studies on women's conditions in the third world: "Recent feminist research has emphasized the dynamic and conflictual interactions between capitalist factory employment, households, the state, and Third World women, supplanting the mechanistic narrative of women's subsumption to the logic of capital accumulation with multiple stories of complexity and contestation." By way of example, Gayatri Spivak relates that in a semiconductor plant in South Korea, male workers conspired with the management to violently quash women workers engaging in union activism. "To speak of a working class with shared interests under such conditions would require turning a blind eye to the unease felt by working-class men when women are employed in the industrial sector and become the subjects of a struggle for rights.

Moreover, they say, Fraser does not seem to be aware that there are several movements that link women's struggles directly with those of the working class. For instance, the Self-Employed Women's Association (SEWA) is a syndical movement established in India by poor southern women which has campaigned to provide women with employment, wages, food security, and social rights since 1972. But SEWA does not aim only to increase women's wages, it also seeks to empower them to change the roles attributed to them by society and within the domestic sphere. Similarly in Great Britain, Women Working Worldwide operates within an international network formed by female workers. The Clean Clothes Campaign in the Netherlands defends the cause of women working in the textile industry, in sweatshops, factories, and homes by publicizing their struggles in Europe. Feminists have also intervened in Venezuela's discussion of politics, labor and economics to amend the constitution, to establish institutions such as the Women's Development Bank and the Venezuelan Women's Institute, (INAMUJER) and to redefine domestic labor as a productive activity." The Global Women's Strike, whose motto is "Invest in Caring, not Killing," is a grassroots network with associates in a number of countries, which asks for recognition of care-work and for military budgets to be handed over to communities themselves. These feminist activists do not separate the problems faced by women qua women from problems of economic exploitation and inequality.

When Fraser claims that the feminist movement has abandoned economic analysis without mentioning any of these studies and activities, she misrepresents the "cunning of history." Instead of considering feminist discourse as a form of activism whose demands change and transform themselves according to the power structures against which it struggles while preserving a relatively stable core of fundamental principles, she offers only a snapshot of one historical moment and generalizes from it. She defines demands formulated by the second-wave feminism of a particular class in the North as being those of the entire feminist movement. She does not consider the idea that women's liberation may not come about through a single unitary practice beyond and above geographies. Walking arm-in-arm with capitalism, patriarchy may don various masks to use feminist demands to serve its own purposes, but feminist discourses also constitute and reconstitute themselves along the way. In this sense, feminism appears as a field in which a discursive struggle operates to de-fine ever anew the relationship between women and freedom. The history of the feminist movement can be narrated as a global assemblage of interactions and conflicts that continuously construct and deconstruct feminist discourses. Many of the feminists we cite here are conscious of the ongoing nature of the struggle; the demands that they formulate, far from being static, are formed dynamically within that struggle as a whole.": This is why Fraser misjudges feminists' contribution to producing alternative discourses, and neglects the reasons behind the absence of a strong and unified feminist opposition to neo-liberalism.

Critique of Domination

The writers say that a second major problem in Fraser's analysis involves reducing feminism to four instances of the critique of state-organized capitalism in the North: the critique of economism, of androcentrism, of étatism and of Westphalianism. This approach glosses over the ways in which feminism has served as a ground for exposing various forms of domination. Instead, as we would argue, feminism were to be construed as an imaginary or a logic, an ethos or an epistemology that has developed for over a century, its counter

systemic principles become readily discernable. Concrete feminist practices within particular historical contexts have changed over time, but the underlying logic of feminism has not. Recalling the paths opened up by this logic might provide us with a healthier framework through which to assess feminism's relation to neoliberalism. The writers say that first of all, it must be conceded that the totality of feminist practices and imaginaries have contributed to deconstructing some of the normative ideals that liberalism has embraced unproblematically. Fraser takes note of this, but fails to integrate the implications into her theoretical analysis. Feminism has made us question such oppositions as private/public and reason/sentiment. It has exposed how the rational notion of public good that underlies liberal thought can become exclusionary, and how such an understanding of publicness is grounded in male-dominated norms. Analyses by feminist theorists have deciphered the masculine and exclusive nature of liberal modernity and laid bare the power structures inherent in universalist norms. In this sense, feminist thought runs parallel to Marx's deciphering of the presumed universality of bourgeois values.

But, the writers say, the paths opened up by feminism have also initiated the development of an epistemology that cannot be reduced to a class perspective. For the bulk of feminism's critique of domination is not limited to the recognition of the place of women within the public sphere; it also questions the sites and mechanisms of power.

A clear indication that feminists have not abandoned economic considerations is the newly emerging discipline called feminist economics, which attempts to construct exactly this permeability between disciplines. Feminist economics looks at social phenomena not only through the perspective of the economy, but also through a social, cultural and political framework centered on women. What is more, the endeavor to develop a feminist economics cannot be reduced to a mere attempt to free the science of economics from its male-centeredness. Feminist economics seeks an alternative approach to all modernist studies of the economy, whether liberal or socialist. It is therefore possible to interpret the transition in feminist thought from modernist methods towards post-modernism and post-structuralism as being part of its effort to overcome both liberal and socialist modernity. The writers further say that experiences accumulated through practical struggles have made feminists quite aware of the fact that liberating or empowering women may not depend on allowing them a place within existing spheres of power. It is simply not true that feminists are unaware of such dilemmas; they have in fact drawn theoretical lessons from them. As Spike V. Peterson stresses, feminism is not about empowering women only, but also about the "transformative critique of hierarchies that are linked and ideologically 'naturalized' by denigration of the feminine." The category "women" needs to be problematized rather than taken for granted.

The writers say that Feminist theory, then, has developed from its initial interest in the rights of women into a critique of multiple dominations that destabilizes conventional categories, and establishes complex links between the various modes of excluding certain groups from the allocation of vital resources, political power, and recognition. Having grasped the fact that representations of the other have ethical and political consequences, innumerable feminists of the post-structuralist or subaltern schools have developed discourses that relentlessly question existing hegemonies, thus the reductionist and exclusionary meta-narratives that nurture neo-liberalism. Today much of feminist theory is about establishing links between different forms of oppression to reveal the ways in which we move back and forth between our multiple subjectivities; what is dominant or dominated depends on specifying forms of oppression. This is what Wendy Brown and Joan Wallach Scott call "the feminist analytics of power."

The writers say that disregarding the existence of such theorizing, Fraser accuses feminism of becoming "a variant of identity politics" and seems to assume that identity politics is a sort of fad that is absent of critique, devoid of anti-systemic power, and incapable of initiating any progressive politics (108). She fails to mention that identity is a category that feminists, at least as far back as Simone de Beauvoir, have problematized. The whole debate provoked by the so-called third wave of feminist theory remains entirely absent from Fraser's text. This actually signals the extent to which her conceptualization of power remains unitary and within the limits imposed by modernism.

But, the writers believe, if Fraser were to narrate the history of feminism, not with respect to a holistic and self-conscious structural subject called capitalism, but, as Michel Foucault has suggested, with respect to the history of techniques of power, she would have realized that feminism has developed very particular resistance strategies and that the success or failure of the feminist movement cannot be accounted for by the impacts it has had on the institutions of the North. Women's movements that have remained faithful to the feminist ethos have always had to collide with capitalist social structures that form the material foundation of a certain version of modernity, even when not struggling openly against capitalism proper. This is the reason why, instead of pitting feminism against other social movements, one must consider how feminist critique has become significant and indispensable for other types of contestation.

Seen from this perspective, the writers say, it appears as if Fraser has distanced herself from the critique she once directed towards Jürgen Habermas's liberal-modernist notion of the public sphere. In her 1992 critique, Fraser relied partly on feminism to expose the power relations obliterated by Habermas's normative model and pointed to some of the problems inherent in liberal.

Normatively, she argued that when considered from the viewpoint of social groups that are oppressed or excluded, the Habermasian public sphere functioned to preserve the interests of dominant groups and, instead of correcting existing modes of inequality and discrimination, could actually intensify them. Habermas's model did not address injustices related to gender, class, and ethnicity; it minimized the political relevance of social identities by relegating them to the private sphere. It also disregarded the constitutive role of struggle, and denied the existence of a multiplicity of public spheres that competed with each other. According to Fraser, "it is precisely because [Habermas] fails to examine these other public spheres that he ends up idealizing the liberal public sphere."

It is evident that the feminist critique of liberal thought, whose historical development goes in tandem with that of the capitalist mode of production, informed Fraser's critique of Habermas. The writers point out that had Fraser pursued the arguments developed in 1992 to their logical conclusion, that is, had she construed feminism as a critique of liberalism and modernism, she would have been in a better position to notice the ways in which feminism is inherently poised against bourgeois imaginaries and practices. The bourgeois ideology that nurtures neoliberalism is as male dominant as that nurturing liberalism. Put differently, feminism is a constellation of imaginaries that carries the critical theory of the Frankfurt School so dear to Fraser to very different, and sometimes postmodern, horizons. Its relationship to neoliberalism should be evaluated by taking this into account. Reducing second-wave feminism to select discourses and demands voiced in the North means failing to assess the critical potential inherent in feminist logic-in addition to idealizing a particular feminist public sphere at the expense of others.

The Cunning of Causality

The writers again point out that a third question that Fraser doesn't address is whether or not it is indeed possible to assess second-wave feminism independently of the organizational crises into which opposition movements in northern countries were plunged in the late 1970s. Neoliberalism is a highly complex and ambivalent process of capital accumulation. It may be difficult and even erroneous to construct strict causalities when analyzing this process.

For instance, when accounting for the transition from a state-organized capitalist economy to a market-oriented one, working class movements and unionism must actually be the first places to investigate. One of the major reasons why capital had to reorganize itself against the social welfare state, and use that very state for its own purposes, was that the social rights obtained by the working class throughout years of struggle had become obstacles to the accumulation of capital. Social rights constituted one of the biggest excuses for capital to flee from the North to countries in the South where labor was cheap and unprotected. Moreover, the social welfare state that turned private and social life into the object of administrative and bureaucratic regulations was a result of the demands of the working class. It is therefore extremely risky to assume that progressive economic demands necessarily produce anti-capitalist effects.

It is here that the error in causality becomes acute. Fraser holds the women's movement, the New Left's artistic critique (which was initiated by the Frankfurt School so dear to Fraser), and the primacy of struggles around identity and recognition responsible for the rise of neoliberalism (109). She then proceeds to attribute neoliberalism's crisis to the workings of global finance and to the post-neoliberal stances of state leaders, as if capitalist economy could be curbed only by politics or by its own inner mechanisms (113). She does not even consider the possibility that feminists, some of whom she cites (Judith Butler, Hester Eisenstein, Sonia Alvarez, Carol Barton, Uma Narayan, Margaret Beck, and Kathryn Sikkink), and some of whom she does not cite (such as the feminist economists mentioned here), may have contributed to driving neoliberalism into crisis and provoking a transformation in its political leaders' discourses. The writers say that as we have tried to show, feminists are part and parcel of the anti-globalization chorus. They raise their voices against processes of capital accumulation, against privatization frenzies, against the paradigm of flexible labor, against NGOization, and against the precariousness of ethnicized and gendered bodies that characterize neoliberal social life.

Curiously enough, writers say, Fraser fails to see that some of the criticisms she levels against second-wave feminism can also be directed against certain strands in the Left. The four principal axes around which Fraser situates feminist struggle (economism, androcentrism, étatism, and Westphalianism) have been principles or modes of operation that the institutionalized Left (Social Democrats or Communists) have encouraged, adopted or, to say the least, have failed to problematize. Thus, the question that Fraser asks ("Was it a mere coincidence that second-wave feminism and neoliberalism prospered in tandem?") can readily be turned around: Was it a mere coincidence that the seeds of neoliberalism were sown at a time when, in the 1970s, Social Democracy and radical Leftism were at their peak both in the first world and in the third world, where independence wars were being fought against colonialism? (108). Was it a mere coincidence that such a strong Left has failed to show any resistance whatsoever in the face of the fragmentation and ultimate incorporation of the labor process into the operations of neoliberal capitalism?

It is exactly at this point that the relationship between neoliberalism and neo-conservatism must be properly established. Second-wave feminism's critique of traditional authority has, according to Fraser, removed the barriers holding capital accumulation in check. The "subterranean elective affinity between feminism and neoliberalism" is to be sought in this critique, described as having detached economic rationality from its social embeddedness (114). But neoliberalism does not breed from the ashes of collapsed traditions. On the contrary, as Wendy Brown argues, it builds upon the reinstitution of tradition. Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom and Ronald Reagan, George H. W. Bush, and George W. Bush in the United States are conservative as well as neoliberal. They could not have dismantled existing social securities, reduced the power of labor unions, and allowed for the penetration of the individualist and competitive values of market economy to every sphere of life, had it not been for the return of the discourse of tradition as the condition of possibility for neo-liberalism. As paradoxical as this may seem, the newly rising values of family, community, marriage, religion, morality, and patriotism have absorbed the shock of the destruction caused by neo-liberalism in social structures. Neo-conservatism calls women back into the home to become the mothers of their children and the aid and support of their husbands, while neo-liberalism exhorts them to become cheap sources of labor.

The writers point out that Fraser completely overlooks the grandiose and paradoxical alliance between neo-liberalism and neo-conservatism. She thus fails to see how feminism, even when it consists of pure identity politics, can actually stand against the system. Neo-conservatism is the rejection of the ground obtained by feminists in the domains of family, sexuality, and such bodily rights as abortion. Thus, it can be said that we need more of feminism, not less.

What we are trying to emphasize is this: classifying problems and demands separately as political, economic, or social is not helpful when it comes to assessing the capacity of social movements to stand against capitalism in general, and against the new phase of capitalism called neo-liberalism in particular. That a demand falls squarely within the framework of identity politics cannot be the sole reason why it is assimilated by the process of capital accumulation. The capitalist system is capable of appropriating and using a variety of

demands for its own purposes. It is a mistake to construe capitalism as a system that is coherent and devoid of contradictions such that certain demands may unambiguously stand against it, while others cannot. An anti-systemic politics can arise only when all of the contradictions and paradoxes in capitalist social relations are taken into consideration. A posteriori evaluations show that capital accumulation may be nurtured by practices and discourses that are hostile to it. But what a posteriori analyses also show is that certain practices, which may appear as part and parcel of the status quo, may end up opening new spaces of resistance. When multinational corporations attempt to clamp patents on herbs that modern medicine has long denigrated, but that women of the South gathered and used for centuries, this traditional practice and the highly domesticated women who were involved in it suddenly become actors in the neo-liberal struggle. A one-sided analysis of neo-liberal processes unnecessarily hampers our ability to grasp the complexity of such reversals.

In the end, the writers assert that the feminist movement would of course benefit from distancing itself from its past and present to discuss the various problems and dilemmas it is now facing at the local and global levels. The ambivalence of neo-liberalism compels us to heed Fraser's call to rethink feminist politics. Yet, it is quite clear to us that this cannot be achieved through her modernist views of history that constructs unitary subjects. To paraphrase Marx, such accounts carry the risk of naturalizing what actually needs to be problematized.

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